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Inter-Branch Relations in US Trade
Policymaking: Balance of Power or
Authoritarian Drift?
Les relations inter-branches dans l'élaboration de la politique commerciale




1 Reclaiming Congressional Authority Trade Act (S. 899), the Global Trade Accountability
Act  (H.R.  723),  Level  the  Playing  Field  in  Global  Trade  Act  (S.  1747),  Promoting
Responsible and Free Trade Act (H.R. 3673), Bicameral Congressional Trade Authority
Act (S. 287), US Reciprocal Trade Act (H.R. 764), Self-Initiation Trade Enforcement Act
(S. 564): under the radar of news headlines on President Trump’s trade wars, the year
2019 saw a proliferation of trade bills designed to alter the course of US trade policy on
behalf  of  fairness,  reciprocity,  accountability  or  sustainability.  While  many of  them
sought to reassert congressional authority over trade policymaking (S. 899, H.R. 723, S.
1747,  S.  287),  a  few bills  summoned the Executive branch to intensify its  efforts  to
defend America’s  economic interests  against  other  countries’  unfair  trade practices
(H.R.  764,  S.  564).  This  invisible  outburst  of  congressional  activity  in  a  period
characterized by legislative impasse not only reflected the deep political divisions over
President  Trump's  America  First  policy  but was  also  the  latest  incarnation  of  the
hyperpolarization of American politics. 
2 Admittedly, partisanship has long been a central feature of trade politics, as illustrated
by the rich literature on determinants of congressional trade votes1 and by the fierce
debates over the terms of trade liberalization in the 1990s and twenty-first century
(Shoch, 2001; Destler, 2005, chapter 11). Yet, beyond the polarizing effects of the Trump
presidency, the power struggle over the conduct of American trade policy stemmed
from  antagonistic  pressures  inherent  to  the  international  political  economy  of  the
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twenty-first  century,  with  implications  far  beyond  US  domestic  politics.  In  an
illustration  of  Rodrik’s  “globalization  paradox,”  the  search  for  regulatory
harmonization has collided with the will to protect democratic governance, thereby
exacerbating interbranch conflicts (Rodrik, 2012; see also Velut & Dalingwater, 2018).
First,  the  advent  of  a  multipolar  world has  generated new demands for  a  stronger
response  from  the  Executive  branch.  In  other  words,  rising  competitive  pressure
stemming  from the  emergence  of  rivaling  economic  powers  has  created  a  need  to
centralize  trade  powers  and  pursue  a  more  aggressive trade  agenda  among
industrialized countries. As this article will show, this agenda has been deployed both
offensively, as witnessed by the race for trade agreements across the globe (Dür, 2010,
Velut,  2018;  Deblock  &  Lebullenger,  2018),  and  defensively,  through  an  array  of
protective  measures,  whose  use  has  fluctuated since  the  early  debates  on Japanese
competition.
3 Second, the ever-expanding scope of the “trade” agenda and its “regulatory turn” has
mobilized a  growing constellation of  civil  society  stakeholders  and,  in  conjunction,
prompted  attempts  to  assert  parliamentary  oversight  over  the  conduct  of  trade
negotiations  (Laursen  &  Roeder-Rynning,  2017).  As  attested  by  the  increasing
participation of  environmental,  human rights,  health,  or  digital  rights  advocates  in
trade debates, the political economy of trade can no longer be reduced to factor-based
and sector-specific  models (Velut,  2018;  Deblock & Lebullenger,  2018).  Likewise,  the
increasing complexity of trade agreements means that the voice of Congress cannot be
reduced to a referendum over free trade or protectionism but is also raised to preserve
legislative prerogatives over the regulation of state-market relations in a broad range
of policy spheres. 
4 This article analyzes the growing interbranch conflicts inherent to the design of US
trade policymaking and the search for a balance of power between the legislative and
the executive branches amidst growing debates on the merits of globalization. To do so,
it first traces the origins of these conflicts and establishes the 1974 Trade Act as an
underappreciated  turning  point  for  interbranch  conflicts.  Second,  it  situates  these
institutional conflicts temporally across different trade policy instruments to reveal
that congressional oversight is less likely to occur with protective measures than trade-
liberalizing policies. Finally, it explores the drivers of executive-legislative contention
and assesses its complex relations with partisan polarization. The article is divided into
three sections. The first revisits the Trade Act of 1974 to understand its institutional
legacy for contemporary debates on globalization and trade policy. The second part
puts these questions to the test by analyzing the manufacturing of US FTA policy in the
post-NAFTA era,  while  the  third  scrutinizes  the  dynamics  of  inter-branch relations
concerning the administration of US trade remedies. 
 
02. The origin of the conflict: the Janus-faced nature
of the Trade Act of 1974 
5 From an institutional standpoint, the history of American trade policy is often divided
into two eras: a period a congressional dominance over trade policy (1776-1934) when
lawmakers maintained protective tariffs on behalf of American business interests and
workers; and a period of shared powers (1934 to today), when Congress delegated its
tariff-setting  authority  to  the  Executive  branch  to  protect  itself  from protectionist
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pressures (Destler, 1986). Under this framework, the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
of 1934 (RTAA) is often depicted as an institutional earthquake that allowed the United
States  to  embrace  a  new  era  of  trade  liberalization  under  Executive  leadership
(Goldstein, 1986; Haggard, 1988). 
6 Amidst  students  of  US  trade  politics,  the  historical  legacy  of  the  RTAA  has  long
overshadowed  the  Trade  Act  of  1974  (hereafter  1974  TA),  despite  the  latter’s
remarkable significance for contemporary debates over globalization and democracy.
Yet,  the  1974  TA first  crystallized  the  tensions  over  the  democratic  governance  of
American trade policy in an era of declining US economic primacy. To understand its
long-term stakes, it is important to examine both the roots and the content of the 1974
TA. 
7 With  the  increasing  scope  given  to  non-tariff  barriers  in  trade  negotiations  in  the
1960s,  Congress  grew more reluctant  to  delegate  its  constitutional  powers,  lest  the
Executive branch might encroach upon its legislative prerogatives. Thus, in 1966, the
Senate passed a resolution instructing the administration of Lyndon Johnson against
negotiating "non-tariff  commitments."  These  included the  "American Selling Price"
method that inflated the prices of imported goods, as well as the negotiation of a new
anti-dumping code at GATT. This was a first signal of rising tensions between the two
branches. When President Johnson ignored congressional injunctions, Congress refused
to  implement  non-tariff  barriers  (NTB)  reforms.2 Thus,  the  Executive’s  efforts  to
establish  reciprocal  rules  for  the  international trading  system  conflicted  with
Congressional attempts to preserve its constitutional role in US decision-making in the
face of an expanding trade-negotiating agenda.
8 This first standoff is what prompted the Nixon administration to request greater trade-
negotiating  power.  The  1974  Trade  Act  sought  to  find  a  compromise  between
empowering  the  Executive  branch  to  undertake  increasingly  complex  trade
negotiations  while  preserving  congressional  authority  over  trade  policy.  This  new
delegation of power was driven by Washington’s search for fairness and reciprocity
amidst rising concerns over the proliferation of non-tariff barriers in Europe and Asia.3
Thus,  in  a  bipartisan  fashion,  Congress  agreed  to  expand  the  trade  powers  of  the
Executive branch, even though the new negotiations would ultimately intrude in a wide
range  of  regulatory  fields  traditionally  under  the  purview  of  Congress  and/or  the
states.4 The result  was a compromise that,  paradoxically,  empowered the Executive
branch while reinforcing congressional oversight, creating a Janus-faced or “hybrid”
apparatus  that  would  sustain  tensions  within  the  decision-making  process  in
forthcoming decades. 
9 Executive empowerment in trade policymaking took four forms: 1) the broadening of
negotiating powers; 2) increased discretion over protective measures; 3) a progressive
build-up in institutional capacities; 4) new limitations on congressional oversight. First,
the President’s negotiating mandate was expanded to non-tariff barriers. In this sense,
the 1974 TA was a logical response to the new competitive challenges that the US faced
in Western Europe and Asia. However, throughout the text of the 1974 TA, barriers and
distortions of trade remained so ill-defined as to give almost unlimited scope to the
President's  new  trade-negotiating  agenda.5 The  second  step  consolidating  the
Executive's  authority  in  trade  policymaking  was  the  strengthening  of  the  Special
Representative for Trade Negotiations, placed in the Executive Office of the President
by law and given cabinet rank under the 1974 TA, the first step before its reinforcement
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five years later under the name of Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR).6 The
third sign of executive empowerment was the creation of fast track authority, under
which Congress accepted to limit its control over the ratification process by submitting
trade deals to a yes-or-no vote within 90 days with no amendment. 
10 Fourth, the 1974 TA was a pivotal point that expanded presidential powers over trade
remedies in at least three ways: 1) by creating a new “balance of payments” authority
under section 122; 2) by granting the President with terminal and withdrawal authority
under section 125;7 and 3)  by establishing new powers to tackle import barriers or
discriminatory practices under the notorious section 301. In a sense, the broad terms of
section 3018 went far beyond the temporary delegation of negotiating authority under
the fast track and gave the President broad discretion to target unfair trade practices.
In  effect,  Congress  explicitly  entrusted  the  President  to  act  as  the  guardian  of  US
economic interests. 
11 In the short term, these provisions of the 1974 TA empowered the Executive branch to
tackle the non-tariff barriers that became central to the US-Japan confrontation over
“unfair trade” – the Tokyo Round being the first attempt to address these concerns at
GATT. In the long run, these new powers would enable the US administration to stand
at the center of multilateral negotiations and, from the 1980s on,9 to become a driving
force  for  the  “new  wave  of  regionalism”  of  the  1990s,  and  the  ambitious  deep
integration  agenda  of  the  twenty-first  century.10 Thus,  the  1974  TA  would  allow
Washington to stay on the course of trade liberalization in the face of rising domestic
concerns over the international competition while strengthening executive power to
fight against foreign trade practices deemed to be unfair. 
12 Yet,  far  from  a  blank  check  to  the  Executive  branch,  this  trade  law  also  included
important  provisions  to  ensure  congressional  oversight  over  the  Executive.  First,
unlike the congressional delegation under the RTAA, Congress reclaimed power over
the implementation of trade bills, thereby retaining a degree of control over the terms
of  trade  agreements  after  their  signature.  Second,  at  the  other  end  of  the  trade
negotiating  process,  the  Trade  Act  of  1974  (sections  103  and  104)  established
negotiating objectives that the Executive branch had to fulfill. Although these were
neither specific nor binding at the time,11 they would set the ground for the definition
of more specific objectives in the future and would become increasingly constraining
over time.12 Third, Congress required the President to consult with the House Ways and
Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee during the negotiations (section
102c) and appointed 10 members as advisers to the trade-negotiating delegation (from
5 members under the 1962 TEA), once again setting a precedent for tighter consultation
rules in the future (Fergusson, 2015). Fourth, Congress admonished the President to
inform  and  seek  advice  from  the  International  Trade  Commission  (formerly  Tariff
Commission)  as  a  prerequisite  for  negotiating  offers  on  tariff  duties  and  from  the
Departments  of  Agriculture,  Commerce,  Defense,  Labor,  State  the Treasury and the
USTR  (sections  131,  132  and  134).  Finally,  the  tremendous  powers  granted  to  the
Executive  under  sections  125  and  301  remained  under  congressional  oversight,
requiring notification from the Executive before action and even allowing Congress to
annul the President’s decision.13 This showed that despite expanded Executive powers,
Congress retained the final say over trade policymaking, following its constitutional
prerogatives. 
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13 This brief analysis of the institutional framework of the TA1974 shows that questions of
congressional oversight and accountability were as crucial as the perceived imperative
to  further  delegate  trade-negotiating  authority  to  the  Executive  in  the  face  of
intensifying competition. The Trade Act of 1974 crystallized these tensions between the
search  for  reciprocity  and  the  demands  of  democratic  governance  and  set  many
precedents upon which future trade reforms would build. These precedents covered
the whole duration of the trade-negotiating process,  ranging from the definition of
negotiating objectives to notification and consultation requirements to greater control
over the implementation of trade agreements. The other paradox of the 1974 TA is that
while  Congress  gave  the  green  light  to  the  Executive  branch  to  promote  trade
liberalization by tackling NTBs, it also set the ground for new protectionist battles both
by loosening eligibility for import relief and creating new trade defense instruments
under the purview of the Executive branch. These institutional mechanisms epitomized
the logic of shared powers in US trade policymaking. Yet, only a few decades later, they
would turn American trade policy into a constant struggle between the executive and
the legislative branches, be it over the negotiation of trade agreements or the adoption
of trade remedies. 
 
03. Assessing congressional oversight over FTA policy
3.1 Institutional reforms: toward greater accountability?
14 If the 1974 TA considerably strengthened Executive discretion in trade negotiations,
subsequent reforms in 1979 (Trade Act), 1984 (1984 Omnibus Trade Tariff Act), and 1988
(Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act) also confirmed congressional determination
to  retain  control  over  the  negotiation  of  trade  agreements.  The  development  of
America’s FTA policy since the 1990s has tested the logic of codetermination. From an
institutional standpoint, the stormy debates surrounding the ratification of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) were an apt reminder of the legacy of the
1974  TA:  the  Executive  branch’s  venturing  into  new  policy  realms  (investment
protection, government procurement, intellectual property) for geostrategic purposes
triggered a fierce legislative battle over the terms of NAFTA, and more specifically over
its labor and environmental provisions. This power struggle over the terms of trade
agreements would become a recurrent pattern over the next three decades, shaped by
partisan dynamics, electoral factors, and sectoral forces. 
15 US lawmakers’ ambivalence about trade liberalization was not confined to the terms of
trade  agreements  but  also  challenged  the  very  logic  of  fast  track  authority,  as
witnessed by Bill Clinton’s failure to obtain trade negotiating powers in 1997 and 1998.
Admittedly, partisan politics already informed voting behavior in both cases (Barfield,
1998; Bardwell, 2000; Conley, 1999). Interestingly, this set of legislative setbacks did not
prevent the Democratic presidential to negotiate what was arguably one of the most
consequential trade deals in US history, i.e. the terms of China’s accession to the World
Trade Organization. Yet, with or without fast track, interbranch conflicts were also at
play insofar as the Permanent Normalization of Trade Relations with China deprived
Congress of its yearly review of China’s Most Favored Nation (MFN) status, something
that had become a contentious ritual in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square
massacre.
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16 Thus, the tumultuous globalization debates of the 1990s prompted Congress to reassert
its authority over trade policymaking. This rebalancing process between the executive
and the legislative branches was deployed in three steps: the 2002 Bipartisan Trade
Promotion  Authority  Act  (BTPAA),  which  contributed  the  most  to  strengthening
congressional oversight, the May 10th Deal of 2007, more concerned with the substance
of FTAs than the decision-making process,14 and the 2015 Bipartisan Comprehensive
Trade Priorities and Accountability Act (BCPTAA), which imposed new obligations on
the  Executive  branch.  These  institutional  reforms were  not  merely  concerned with
finding the right balance between economic leadership and democratic accountability.
Under the façade of bipartisanship, they were also driven by partisan interests: while
Democratic lawmakers sought to reign in George W. Bush’s competitive liberalization
agenda  in  both  2002  and  2007;  the  2015  trade  reform  passed  under  a  Republican
majority  was designed to reassert  congressional  oversight  in  the context  of  Barack
Obama’s TPP and TTIP negotiations. However, each party remained divided over trade
liberalization, showing that interbranch conflicts transcended partisan politics. 
17 Table 1 summarizes the development of the US trade policy process since the 1974 TA
and  its  impact  on  inter-branch  relations.  It  reveals  that  while  Congress  initially
accepted to expand the delegation of trade-negotiating power to the Executive branch
to allow it to take the lead in bilateral, regional and multilateral negotiations, it has
also sought to maintain a  tight  grip on trade agreement policy at  all  stages of  the
decision-making, i.e. before, during and after negotiations. 
18 Before the negotiations, Congress first decides whether or not to grant the President with
fast  track  or  trade  promotion  authority,  in  effect  defining  how  ambitious  trade
negotiations  may  be.15 Lawmakers  intervene  before  negotiations  by  requiring  the
President to  notify  congressional  committees  of  his  intent  to  negotiate  a  trade
agreement  60  days  before  entering  the  negotiations.  Here,  under  the  so-called
"gatekeeper"  provision,  one  of  the  congressional  committees  can  deny  fast  track
consideration if it disapproves of the negotiations. In addition to the consultation of
congressional committees, the 2002 BTPAA established a new Congressional Oversight
Group composed of members of congressional committees, with which the USTR has to
coordinate before the negotiations.16 A third key instrument for Congressional input
before the negotiations is  the prescription of  a list  of  negotiating objectives which,
since the 1974 TA, has not only grown exponentially but has also become more binding.
Today,  these  objectives  are  divided  into  12  overall  trade  negotiating  objectives,  21
principal trade negotiating objectives covering a wide range of sectors and policies, and
4 capacity building other priorities.17 
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19 Somewhat  paradoxically,  this  new  set  of  constraints  on  the  executive  branch  also
explicitly  expanded  its  negotiating  mandate  to  new  policy  spheres  such  as
transparency rules and electronic commerce. Yet, unlike the 1974 TA, which had made
this  list  non-binding,  the  2002  BTPAA  defined  progress  in  the  fulfillment  of  such
objectives  as  a  condition  for  entering  a  trade  agreement  (section  2103  (b)(2)).  The
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definition  of  negotiating  objectives  gives  Congress  influence  throughout  trade
negotiations. 
20 During  the  negotiations,  Congress  has  imposed  increasingly  demanding  consultation
requirements,  granting  an  ever-greater  number  of  lawmakers  with  access  to  trade
negotiators. Here again, the BTPAA provided the framework for such oversight. This
trade  law  established  strict  requirements  and  guidelines  regarding  notification  to
Congress and consultation both before and during trade negotiations.18 To enforce the
Executive's obligations, Congress retains the right not to implement bills "for lack of
notice or consultation" with Congress or the Congressional Oversight Group. In theory,
it can also adopt a "procedural disapproval" in each chamber to signal its discontent
over the consultation of Congress and thereby influence the trade agreement before it
is finalized (Fergusson, 2015). In practice, however, efforts to keep lawmakers informed
have  often  been  hampered  by  strict  confidentiality  rules  regulating  access  to
negotiating  texts.  The  2015  BCTPAA  imposed  new  transparency  on  the  Executive
branch by creating the position of "Chief Transparency Officer" within the USTR and by
requiring that the latter develop clear guidelines beyond the established framework for
consultations with Congress, the public as well as trade advisory committees (Velut,
2021).
21 Finally, legislative control over trade policymaking also applies after the negotiations,
despite the constraints imposed on congressional ratification under trade promotion
authority. This stems from two reasons. First, as mentioned earlier, Congress retains
the power to refuse expedited procedure if it deems that the President has failed to
meet consultation and reporting requirements. Second, if in theory, trade promotion
authority  bans  amendments  on  trade  agreements,  in  practice,  lawmakers  have
managed to extract a variety of concessions from the President in exchange for their
vote. These concessions are of three kinds. In the tradition of "pork-barrel politics," the
President can promise funding for a lawmaker’s pet project – although, in practice,
these promises are rarely kept.19 Additionally, legislators can obtain import-protection
that may or may not be related to the trade agreement under consideration. These
protectionist side-payments have, of course, a long tradition, but have spared few if
any presidents in the fast track era.20 For instance, during the debates on DR-CAFTA,
the Bush administration managed to secure the vote of five lawmakers, and possibly
obtain the abstention of two additional lawmakers from textile states by announcing
new quotas on cotton shirts, trousers, and underwear from China (Becker, 2005). Last,
but not least, against the spirit of fast track, Congress has often managed to re-open
negotiations after the signature of trade deals. This was the case with the creation of
side agreements under NAFTA, the re-opening of FTA negotiations with Peru, Korea,
and Colombia, and the addition of side letters to trade agreements designed to address
specific (often sectoral) concerns by certain congress members and that require the
signature of both negotiating parties. Of course, within the framework of inter-branch
relations, not all concessions to lawmakers are equal: while certain addenda to trade
agreements  (e.g.  NAFTA's  side  agreements  on  labor  and  the  environment)  can  be
legitimately interpreted as attempts to make trade policy more accountable to all trade
policy stakeholders, other secret deals designed to buy out votes in Congress tend to
shift the process away from accountability. 
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3.2 From theory to practice
22 On paper at least,  greater congressional scrutiny should mean that the trade policy
process  might  become more  accountable.  In  practice,  there  is  ample  evidence  that
Congress  has  played  an  important  role  in  all  major  trade  negotiations.  The  well-
documented rounds of political bargaining surrounding the first negotiation of NAFTA
under both Presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton confirm that, even under fast
track authority, Congress played an important role in shaping the negotiations (Mayer,
1998;  Cameron  &  Maxwell,  2001).  Similarly,  Clinton’s  failure  to  obtain  fast  track
authority  in  1997  and  1998  confirms  that  Executive  empowerment  hinges  on
congressional  approval,  while  George  W.  Bush’s  ability  to  renew  trade  promotion
authority  and  secure  congressional  ratification  of  DR-CAFTA,  among  other  trade
agreements, depended on the strong support of his party in Congress. Of course, the
rise of extreme partisan polarization has dramatically altered these dynamics, but from
an institutional standpoint, Congress retains many of the cards to exert oversight over
trade negotiations. This was clear through both the negotiations of TPP and the US-
Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA),  even though they were undertaken under two
very  different  presidencies.  One  foreign  negotiator  underlined  the  limited  leeway
granted  to  his  American  counterpart  during  both  TPP  and  USMCA  negotiations,
deeming the negotiating objectives established by Congress as more important than the
instructions  of  the  US  chief  negotiator.21 For  better  or  worse, the  power  of
congressional oversight was in full display when lawmakers declined to bring TPP to a
vote at the end of the Obama presidency. Although Republican reticence was arguably
infused  with  partisan  politics,  opposition  transcended  party  lines,  as  witnessed  by
Hillary Clinton’s volte-face against a trade deal that she had spent years promoting. 
23 Given  its  expansive  conception  of  executive  powers,  the  Trump  administration
constitutes a perfect case study to assess the resilience of congressional oversight. In
effect, there is evidence that the White House tested the framework that the legislative
branch  had  gradually  established  to  control  negotiations.  Throughout  the  USCMA
negotiations, Democrats repeatedly criticized the Trump administration for ignoring
consultation requirements under trade promotion authority (Pascrell, 2019). The New
Democrat  coalition,  who  had  provided  crucial  support  to  the  renewal  of  trade
promotion  authority  in  2015  felt  particularly  isolated.  In the  words  of  one  senior
congressional staffer: 
"The lack of engagement from USTR is troubling, but not surprising. We have made
it clear for months our willingness to engage in these discussions and USTR has not
followed through. As our members' said at the recent press conference, we must be
involved  in  the  takeoff,  not  just  the  landing.  We  are  past  takeoff,  but  perhaps
Captain  Lighthizer could  check  in  with  the  control  tower  before  he  starts  his
descent" (cited in Cassella, 2018).
24 Particularly  frustrating  for  pro-trade  Democrats  was  the  fact  that  USTR  Robert
Lighthizer seemed to devote greater attention to potential NAFTA opponents on the
left, including union-backed Democrats and fair trade critics like Public Citizen Global
Trade  Watch  Director  Lori  Wallach.  This  might  explain  why the  new USCMA went
arguably further in the protection of labor rights than TPP, and why it eliminated ISDS.
The attention given to left-leaning Democrats was driven by strategic calculation over
the prospect of congressional ratification but reflected a targeted legislative strategy,
rather than deference to congressional oversight. 
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25 The lesson of  the USMCA regarding interbranch relations is  that legislative politics
often prime over institutional mechanisms. Not only was consultation with Congress
largely driven by vote tallying, confining consultation to swing voters, but lawmakers’
ability  to  bring a  “procedural  disapproval”  is  constrained by  partisan politics.  In  a
context of hyperpartisanship, a divided Congress (with a Democratic majority in the
House and a Republican-led Senate) is unlikely to unite to disapprove of the President’s
lack  of  consultation  with  Congress.  In  this  case,  Republican  lawmakers  were  more
attached to the party and their leader than to the democratic rules governing trade
policy. Thus, in practice, congressional oversight continues to be concentrated at the
beginning and the end of the trade policy process – i.e. when lawmakers renew fast
track and when they ratify the agreement – instead of throughout trade negotiations.
The key concessions secured by House Democrats under the leadership of Nancy Pelosi
in  the  final  negotiations  of  the  USMCA  confirms  that  Congress  continues  to  hold
tremendous power over the design of US FTA policy.
26 In another example of this interbranch power struggle, President Trump had raised the
threat of unilaterally withdrawing from NAFTA to pressure lawmakers from ratifying
the USMCA. The potential use of section 125 of the Trade Act raised alarm in Congress
and renewed debates about executive prerogatives and congressional oversight. Yet, if
the Trump administration has undoubtedly sought greater executive discretion in the
conduct of  US trade negotiations,  there are reasons to believe that Congress would
have prevailed, had President made good on this threat to withdraw from NAFTA. First,
under  the  1974  TA,  Congress  retains  power  over  the  implementation  of  trade
agreements.  This means that absent a Congressional vote to repeal that the NAFTA
Implementation Act, the 1994 trade law would subsist even under a formal withdrawal
from  NAFTA.  Second,  even  if  President  Trump  decided  to  combine  formal  NAFTA
withdrawal with tariff  hikes,  Congress could very well  thwart his actions,  either by
voting on a resolution of disapproval on NAFTA withdrawal or by deciding to restrain
Executive  power.  Third,  as  Douglas  Irwin notes,  unilateral  withdrawal  from NAFTA
would likely prompt challenges in court (Aleem, 2017). Given Congress’s authority to
regulate commerce under the Constitution, courts would likely side with the legislature
in the event of inter-branch conflicts over trade powers. 22This explains why after the
signature of the USMCA, and under the recommendation of USTR Robert Lighthizer,
Donald Trump toned down his threat to withdraw from NAFTA to force Congress to
vote on the USMCA. 
27 In  short,  these  examples  challenge  common  representations  of  an  all-powerful
Executive capturing the policy process.  Indeed,  successive trade reforms since 1974
have sought to rebalance the policy process in favor of the legislative branch, endowing
Congress  with  several  instruments  to  defend  its  constitutional  powers  at  different
stages  of  the  trade-negotiating  process.  In  theory,  these  institutional  mechanisms
maintain the constitutional functions assigned to Congress to “regulate commerce.”
Yet, in trade politics as elsewhere, the dynamics of partisan polarization have dulled
the  sharp  edge  of  democratic  governance  embedded  in  decades  of  institutional
reforms. The next section assesses the nature of inter-branch relations concerning the
use of trade remedies. 
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04. Interbranch conflicts over trade remedies
28 From the early negotiations on NAFTA to the election of Donald Trump, the debates on
congressional oversight in trade policymaking focused primarily on trade agreement
policy.  Washington’s  shift  from  its  well-established  doctrine  of  “competitive
liberalization”  to  a  new  mercantilist  “America  First”  agenda  gave  a  new  twist  to
questions  of  democratic  accountability.  Before  analyzing  the  consequences  of
America’s  protectionist  turn on the democratic  governance of  US trade policy,  two
points  are  worth underlining.  First,  trade remedies  are interdependent but  distinct
policy  instruments  embedded  in  different  institutional  arrangements  from  the
negotiations of trade agreements. Second, protective measures adopted against unfair
trade competition have a long tradition in American history (Irwin, 2017).  Even the
recent  period  of  competitive  liberalization  was  never  sealed  from  the  pressure  of
import-competing interests, nor did the Executive unequivocally adhere to the fabled
doctrine of free trade. This section analyzes the institutional framework of protective
measures  before  discussing  more  recent  developments  in  interbranch  relations.  It
confirms the legacy of the 1974 Trade Act for contemporary interbranch conflicts and
draws a contrast between the mechanisms of congressional oversight over protective
measures and those designed to constrain trade liberalization. 
 
4.1 The resurgence of institutions of protection
29 As previously mentioned, the 1974 TA was a landmark in the modern history of US
protection insofar as it crystallized conflicts over America’s trade relations with the
rest  of  the  world.  Yet,  given  America's  long  protectionist  tradition,  institutions  of
protection developed long before America's postwar hegemony was challenged by rival
powers. Historically, the governance of US protective measures mirrors the evolution
of interest group dynamics, the institutional underpinnings and the ideological debates
over  the  delegation  of  trade-negotiating  powers:  by  transferring  its  tariff-setting
authority to the Executive branch under the 1934 RTAA, Congress, in effect, refrained
itself from protecting industries. However, the political economy of import relief is not
simply a matter of interplay between the President and Congress, to the extent that it
also involves the Tariff Commission, an independent agency established in 1916 and
renamed US International Trade Commission (ITC) under the Trade Act of 1974. The ITC
assesses  whether  a  domestic  industry  has  suffered  a  material  injury  as  a  result  of
increased imports associated with tariff liberalization, while the International Trade
Administration,  hosted under the Department of  Commerce evaluates  foreign trade
practices such as dumping or subsidies. 
30 Even before  the  RTAA sought  to  isolate  Congress  from protectionist  pressures,  the
transfer  of  trade  remedies  to  the  Tariff  Commission  aimed  at  depoliticizing  trade
protection. The premise was that letting an independent agency administer trade rules
under "objective" criteria would relieve Congress from protectionist pressures while
allowing protection to injured industries under specific circumstances (Destler, 2005).
The 1974 TA increased the independence of the ITC by lengthening its members’ term
from  six  to  nine  years.  In  effect,  however,  both  Congress  and  the  President  have
retained considerable  leverage over  the administration of  trade remedies,  although
their role varies according to the trade remedy under consideration. 
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31 Despite its delegation of tariff-setting authority to the Executive, Congress continues to
exert influence over trade remedies at both ends of the process. At the beginning of the
process, the legislative branch determines the eligibility requirements for import relief
in trade law and can, therefore, indirectly determine the likelihood that petitioning
industries  will  be  granted  protection.  For  instance,  in  the  1974  TA,  Congress  took
important  steps  to  make  import  relief  procedures  more  accessible  to  domestic
industries: 1) by loosening eligibility criteria for section 201,23 TAA and antidumping
procedures24;  2) by shortening the CVD and section 337 (IP infringement and unfair
trade practices) procedures; 3) by allowing for judicial review of the negative ruling on
CVDs.25 Far from depoliticizing the process, these amendments to US trade law would
dramatically  increase  the  number  of  ITC  petitions.  At  the  end  of the  process,
Congressional  committees  (the  House  Ways  and  Means  and  the  Senate  Finance
Committee) can also exert influence on the ITC decision by testifying before the ITC to
support an AD/CVD petition.26 
32 Yet, if Congress has retained some of its tariff-setting authority, the Executive branch
plays a much larger role over the implementation of trade remedies. Historically, the
process of  congressional  delegation of  protective measures to the Executive branch
followed a separate path from trade agreement policy, which occurred primarily in two
forms. First, the President acquired greater authority over retaliatory measures about
perceived national security threats. This was the case with the Trading with the Enemy
Act of 1917, section 232 of the 1962 TEA, and the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IIEPA) of 1977. Second, rising concerns over international competition and
the proliferation of unfair trade practices led Congress to grant the Executive with new
trade defense instruments. These were brought to life in the 1974 TA and reinforced
during the US-Japanese trade battles of the 1980s. These developments, summarized in
Table  2,  illustrate  the  bicephalous  nature  –  if  not  its  schizophrenia  –  of  US  trade
policymaking in the twentieth century and the interbranch conflicts that this reform
engendered in the next thirty years.
33 What were lawmakers' intentions about the democratic governance of trade remedies
and  what  consequences  would  these  reforms  have  on  interbranch  relations?  The
greater autonomy granted to the ITC, in addition to the delegation of trade remedy
powers under the 1974 TA show that Congress was still intent on isolating itself from
protectionist  pressures,  even  though  it  sought  to  make  the  institutional  apparatus
more  responsive  to  domestic  industries’  concerns  over  rising  international
competition.
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34 Admittedly, the growing complexity of the institutional apparatus reflected the will to
establish checks and balances where Congress, the ITC, and the Executive branch were
all  assigned a role to defend America's interests against unfair trade practices.  Yet,
while  traditional  trade  remedies  (anti-dumping,  safeguard  measures  and
countervailing duties)  remain under the purview of the ITC, supposedly immune to
political pressures and partisan dynamics, in most other cases, the Executive branch
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played a dominant function in the administration of trade rules, whether through the
Department of Commerce and its International Trade Administration (e.g. safeguard
measures,  antidumping and countervailing duties),  the USTR (section 301 under its
original and amended forms) or the President (section 232, section 301, section 338,
etc.). This is largely because the Executive branch was long deemed to be immune to
protectionist pressure and more inclined to promote market opening than closure. The
irony of contemporary US trade politics is that institutions designed to promote trade
openness were hijacked by a President convinced by the virtues of protectionism. 
 
4.2 Adieu Congress? US trade remedies in the Trump era
35 The year 2018 saw a dramatic turn in the history of US trade policy. From section 201 to
section  301,  to  the  now  notorious  section  232  of  the  1962  TEA,  the  United  States
deployed its trade policy arsenal to impose a barrage of protective measures that were
unheard  of  since  the  Nixon  shock  of  1971.  In  slightly  more  than  twenty  months
(between January 2018 and September 2019), the Trump administration unleashed no
fewer  than  eight  waves  of  tariffs  against  its  trading  partners:  1)  the  first  wave  of
additional import duties imposed on solar panels (at a 30% tariff rate) and washing
machines (20-50%) in January 2018 under a safeguard measure (section 201), affecting
$10 billion of US imports; 2) and 3) two waves of tariff increase imposed on steel and
aluminum imports (25% and 10% respectively) on behalf of “national security” (section
232), the first (March 2018) applied to most trading partners but exempting Mexico,
Canada and the EU, the second ending this exemption (June 2018), affecting a total of
$22 billion. Additionally, Washington went into a straight confrontation with Chinese
competition by imposing five additional waves of China-specific tariffs: 4) the fourth
wave targeted $34 billion of imports taxed at 25% (July 2018);  5)  the fifth wave hit
another  $16  billion  of  Chinese  goods  (August  2018);  6)  the  sixth  and  largest  wave
imposed another $200 billion of Chinese imports at 10%; 7) a seventh wave of tariff
hikes brought the tariff levels of these targeted imports to 25% effective in June 2019,
and an eighth wave increased section 301 tariffs to 15% on a subset of $300 billion
worth of products) (Amiti, Redding, & Weinstein, 2019; Bown & Kolb, 2019). 
36 Taken  separately,  these  steps  are  arguably  in  line  with  the  previous  protective
measures adopted by other US presidents except for the use of section 232 in the name
of  national  security.  For  instance,  the  frequency  of  traditional  trade  remedies  –
antidumping,  countervailing  duties  and safeguard measures  –  was  lower  under  the
Trump presidency than under the administration of Ronald Reagan, when compared
with the annual average of the 1980-2018 period (Table 4). However, what distinguished
Donald  Trump’s  protectionist  policies  is  not  only  the  combination  of  these  trade
remedies but also their share of US imports, as well as their damaging effects on US
diplomatic relations. 
Inter-Branch Relations in US Trade Policymaking: Balance of Power or Authorit...
Revue Interventions économiques, 65 | 2021
14
37 The  imposition  of  tariff  measures  was  only  one  part  of  Donald  Trump's  “trade
undiplomacy” – albeit a significant one – to which must be added withdrawal from
earlier  commitments,  diplomatic  feuds,  conflictual  (re)negotiations,  threats  of  trade
sanctions, and sustained hostility toward the WTO (Velut, 2018). 
38 More  rarely  acknowledged,  however,  is  the  extent  to  which  the  US  Congress  was
complicit in allowing the President to disrupt both the checks and balances of US trade
governance and the international economic order. Despite strong business mobilization
against  Donald  Trump’s  protectionist  measures  –  e.g.  from  the  US  Chamber  of
Commerce or the Business Roundtable – lawmakers only half-heartedly attempted to
reassert congressional authority over trade policy. As shown earlier, this contrasts with
the realm of FTA policy where the legislative branch has made sustained efforts to
reclaim its constitutional powers, under both Republican and Democratic Presidents.
This discrepancy is largely due to the politics of globalization, and more specifically the
enduring appeal of trade-bashing among American voters. The very cautious posturing
of candidates in the Democratic primaries on the US-China trade wars was a testament
to the enduring power of protectionism (Reinsch & Caporal, 2019; Irwin, 2019). 
39 Admittedly, the US-China trade wars prompted congressional debates about restraining
executive authority, especially among Democratic congressmen. At the same time, the
flurry of trade bills at the committee stage – cited in the introduction of this article –
can be puzzling, given that many statutes already grant Congress with the power to
repeal protective measures deemed detrimental to US economic interests. For instance,
if  both  Democratic  and  Republican  lawmakers  were  truly  dismayed  by  President
Trump's trade wars, they could very well use their statutory powers to put an end to
trade conflicts, e.g. through a resolution of disapproval under section 302 of the 1974
Trade Act. The absence of a strong congressional response to this expansive approach
to executive power in trade policymaking was all the more questionable in the face of
mounting evidence on the costs of protectionism, both at sectoral and regional levels
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(Amiti,  Redding,  &  Weinstein,  2019;  Fajgelbaum et  al.  2019;  Irwin,  2019;  Reinsch  &
Caporal, 2019. In this case, it was the result of extreme partisan polarization, which
superseded the logic of shared powers. 
40 On the other hand, in a deft strategic move, the Trump administration opted for less
conventional  trade  instruments,  pushing  trade  policies  towards  the  Executive's
security turf to insulate itself from congressional oversight: the use of section 232 of
the 1962 TEA and the IEEPA being the most prominent example of the trade-security
nexus. Yet, here again, Congress retains dramatic power to reclaim its constitutional
prerogatives. For instance, section 204 of the IIEPA specifies that “The President, in
every possible instance, shall consult with the Congress before exercising any of the
authorities granted by this chapter and shall consult regularly with the Congress so
long  as  such  authorities  are  exercised".  Under  this  statute,  reinforced  by  the
constitutional powers granted to Congress, the legislative branch could legitimately act
to rein in executive action on behalf of national security. 
 
05. Conclusion
41 The  current  political  economy  of  international  trade  has  exacerbated  institutional
conflicts over the design of US trade policymaking. Whereas increased international
competition has created incentives to centralize power in the executive branch in the
hope of a more aggressive trade policy, the broadening of the trade agenda has also
prompted  Congress  to  exert  greater  oversight  over  the  terms  of  US  trade  policy.
Ratified at  the dawn of  the globalization era,  the 1974 Trade Act  crystallized these
tensions  early  on and even contributed to  the formation of  a  form of  institutional
schizophrenia, where shared powers would ultimately turn into colliding powers. 
42 Concerning FTA policy, Congress has made ample use of its statutory powers to provide
input at every stage of the decision-making process, even though its influence remains
strongest at the end of negotiations. When it comes to trade remedies, however, the
legislative branch has been much more ambivalent to use its constitutional authority to
restrain, let alone block executive action. This is largely due to the continued appeal of
protectionism among US voters, especially the white working class of Rustbelt states,
who continue to be a central constituency for the presidential election. 
43 The implications of this analysis of interbranch relations in US trade policymaking are
two-fold.  First, since  1974,  under  the  dual  imperative  of  economic  leadership  and
democratic governance, trade institutions have undergone a bifurcated development
where both trade-liberalizing and protective measures developed in both executive and
legislative  branches.  The  1974  Trade  Act  has  played  a  structuring  role  in  the
bicephalous nature of US trade policymaking, heralding a long legacy of interbranch
conflicts amidst stormy debates over globalization and the role of the United States in
the world economy. Partisan politics interferes with institutional factors in the design
of US trade policy and, depending on the distribution of power among political parties,
can  either  exacerbate  or  mitigate  interbranch  conflicts.  Second,  and  paradoxically,
institutional mechanisms and legislative reforms can only go so far as to preserve a
balance of power necessary to address the tensions between democratic governance
and international competitiveness. Institutions are only as good as the people that run
them,  an  aphorism  that  has  resonance  far  beyond  the  trade  realm  in  the  current
context  of  US  politics.  Beyond  the  US  case,  this  means  that  efforts  to  curtail
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protectionism cannot be confined to institutional reforms and technocratic solutions,
but must address the roots of globalization fatigue.27 
Caddel, J. (2014). Domestic Competition over Trade Barriers in the US International Trade
Commission. International Studies Quarterly, 58, 260-68.
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NOTES
1. See, for instance, Baldwin & Magee (2000); Biglaiser, Jackson, and Peake (2004).
2. This paragraph draws from Destler (2005) and Fergusson (2015). 
3. In  the words of  Senator Russell  B.  Long (D,  LA),  the United States  had become “the least
favored nation.” (cited in Irwin, 2017, p. 550). 
4. According to  section 102 of  the 1974 TA:  “The Congress  finds that  barriers  to  (and other
distortions of) international trade are reducing the growth of foreign markets for the products of
United States agriculture,  industry,  mining,  and commerce,  diminishing the intended mutual
benefits  of  reciprocal  trade  concessions,  adversely  affecting  the  United  States  economy,
preventing fair and equitable access to supplies, and preventing the development of open and
non-discriminatory trade among nations. The President is urged to take all appropriate and feasible
steps  within  his  power  (including  the  full  exercise  of  the  rights  of  the  United  States  under
international  agreements)  to  harmonize,  reduce,  or  eliminate  such  barriers  to  (and  other
distortions of) international trade. (emphasis added).”
5. Under section 102, the term "barrier" was not clearly defined, but only specified as including
"the American selling prices basis of customs evaluation as defined (…) in the Tariff Act of 1930.
The  term  "distortion"  was  merely  said  to  include  "a  subsidy,"  and  "international  trade"
encapsulated both goods and services. This would be later refined under section 305(d) of Trade
and Tariff Act of 1984, which amended these elusive definitions to include "(1) barriers to the
establishment in foreign markets, and (2) restrictions on the operation of enterprises in foreign
markets, including - (A) direct or indirect restrictions on the transfer of information into, or out
of, the country or instrumentality concerned, and (B) restrictions on the use of data processing
facilities within or outside of such country or instrumentality."
6. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 said nothing about the staff or location of the STR, which was
only  defined  by  President  Kennedy  under  Executive  Order  11075  in  1963  (Destler,  2005,  pp.
103-107).
7. While section 125 arguably falls under trade agreement policy, withdrawal from an agreement
can also be paired with additional tariff measures under section 201 or others: "the President is
authorized to proclaim increased duties or other import restrictions, to the extent, at such times,
and for such periods as he deems necessary or appropriate, to exercise the rights or fulfill the
obligations of the United States" (19 USC 1351). 
8. Section 301 exhorts the President to “take all appropriate and feasible steps within his power
to  obtain  the  elimination  of  such  restrictions  or  subsidies.”  Such  actions  included  (A)  the
suspension  or  withdrawal  of  a  trade  agreement;  and  B)  the  imposition  of  duties  or  import
restrictions on goods and services.
9. Section 401 (4)(a) of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 (1984 TTA) amended the 1974 TA and
allowed,  for  the first  time,  the negotiation of  bilateral  agreements  under certain conditions.
These included the US-Israel and US-Canada free trade agreements. 
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10. For  a  chronology  of  cycles  of  regionalism,  see  Mansfield  &  Milner  (1999);  Velut  (2018);
Deblock (2018).
11. Congress  asked  the  President  to  submit  an  evaluation  of  the  fulfillment  of  negotiating
objectives  if  he  determined  that  competitive  opportunities  in  a  (set  of)  sector(s)  would  be
significantly affected by a trade agreement (section 104(d) of the 1974 TA). 
12. A decade later, the 1984 TTA would draw more specific objectives in services, FDI, and high
technology products. 
13. For instance, section 302 allowed Congress to annul executive action under 301 through a
resolution  of  disapproval.  Withdrawal  from  trade  agreements  under  section  125  is  also
conditioned  upon  notification  to  Congress,  as  President  Trump  was  reminded  when  he
considered  withdrawing  from  NAFTA.  Additionally,  section  203  also  authorized  Congress  to
supersede  a  presidential  action  differing  from  the  recommendations  of  the  ITC  through  a
concurrent resolution approved in each House.
14. The “May 10th deal” of 2007 was an attempt to bridge the partisan divide over trade policy.
The  bipartisan  trade  deal  between  the  new  Democratic  majority  in  Congress  and  the  Bush
administration would not only provide guidelines for the renegotiation of recently signed trade
agreements like the US-Peru FTA but also inform the extension of negotiating objectives for the
renewal of trade promotion authority in 2015.
15. As Destler (2005) argues, although designed to empower the Executive, in effect, the fast track
also forces the President to obtain two votes from Congress instead of one, the first one granting
him with negotiating powers and the second one ratifying a trade agreement.
16. Fergusson and Davis (2019, p. 28).
17. Overall  main  objectives  are  broadly  defined  as  (1)  "to  obtain  more  open,  equitable  and
reciprocal market access", (4) "to foster economic growth, raise living standards, enhance the
competitiveness of the United States, promote full employment in the US, and enhance the global
economy" etc. Principal negotiating objectives are more specific and apply to trade in goods,
trade in services, trade in agriculture, foreign investment, IP, digital trade, regulatory practices,
SOEs,  localization  barriers  to  trade,  labor,  and  the  environment,  currency  issues,  WTO  and
multilateral  trade  agreements,  transparency,  anti-corruption,  dispute  settlement  and
enforcement,  trade  remedy  laws,  border  taxes,  textile,  commercial  partnerships,  good
governance.  Capacity-building  and  other  priorities  consist  of  technical  assistance  to  trading
partners.  P.L.  14-26,  June  29,  2015,  section  102, available  at  https://www.congress.gov/114/
plaws/publ26/PLAW-114publ26.pdf 
18. .  Section 2107 (b)(2)(C) called for “the closest practicable coordination between the Trade
Representative and the Congressional Oversight Group at all critical periods during the negotiations,
including at negotiation sites” (emphasis added).
19. Public Citizen’s study of 2005 revealed that between 1992 and 2004 (before the CAFTA vote),
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ABSTRACTS
This  article  analyzes  the  growing  interbranch  conflicts  inherent  to  the  design  of  US  trade
policymaking and the search for a balance of power between the legislative and the executive
branches amidst recurrent debates on the merits of globalization. To do so, it traces the origins
of these institutional battles and maps out these conflicts across different instruments of the
trade policy apparatus. Additionally, it explores the drivers of executive-legislative contention
and assesses its complex relations with partisan polarization. The conclusions are two-fold. First,
since 1974, under the dual imperative of economic leadership and democratic governance, trade
institutions  have  undergone  a  bifurcated  development  where  both  trade-liberalizing  and
protective measures developed in both executive and legislative branches. The 1974 Trade Act
has  played  a  structuring  role  in  the  bicephalous  transformation  of  US  trade  policymaking,
heralding a long legacy of interbranch conflicts amidst stormy debates over globalization and the
role  that  the  United  States  should  play  in  the  world  economy.  Second,  in  a  context  of
hyperpolarization,  institutional  mechanisms and legislative  reforms can only  go  so  far  as  to
preserve a balance of power necessary to address the tensions between democratic governance
and  international  competitiveness.  Beyond  the  US  case,  this  means  that  efforts  to  curtail
protectionism cannot be confined to policy recommendations and technocratic solutions,  but
must address the political and ideological roots of the current globalization fatigue. 
Cet article analyse les conflits inter-branches inhérents à l’appareil institutionnel de la politique
commerciale  américaine  et  la  recherche  d'un  équilibre  des  pouvoirs  entre  le  législatif  et
l'exécutif, au milieu de débats récurrents sur les bienfaits de la mondialisation. Il retrace ainsi les
origines  de  ces  batailles  institutionnelles  et  cartographie  ces  conflits  au  sein  des  différents
instruments de la politique commerciale. En outre, cette analyse explore les déterminants de
cette  opposition  entre  l'exécutif  et  le  législatif  et  évalue  ses  relations  complexes  avec  la
polarisation partisane. Les conclusions sont doubles. Premièrement, depuis 1974, sous le double
impératif  de  la  primauté  économique et  de  la  gouvernance  démocratique,  les  institutions
commerciales ont connu un processus de bifurcation par lequel des mesures de libéralisation et
de protection se sont développées à la fois au sein de l'exécutif et du pouvoir législatif. Le Trade
Act de  1974  a  joué  un  rôle  structurant  dans  cette  transformation  bicéphale  de  la  politique
commerciale  américaine,  amorçant  une  longue  série  de  conflits  institutionnels  au  milieu  de
débats houleux sur la mondialisation et sur le rôle des États-Unis dans l'économie mondiale.
Deuxièmement,  dans  un  contexte  d'hyperpolarisation,  les  mécanismes  institutionnels  et  les
réformes législatives peuvent difficilement préserver l'équilibre des pouvoirs nécessaire pour
faire face aux tensions entre gouvernance démocratique et compétitivité internationale. Au-delà
du cas  américain,  les  efforts  visant  à  contenir  le  protectionnisme ne peuvent  se  limiter  aux
recommandations  politiques  et  aux  solutions  technocratiques,  mais  doivent  s'attaquer  aux
racines politiques et idéologiques du désamour des peuples vis-à-vis de la mondialisation.
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